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This conative feature is said by Brand to be non-cognitive and to be that aspect of an episode of intending which moves an agent to act. Brand alleges that the conative feature of intending must be included in any satisfactory answer to what he calls the fundamental question in action theory: what characteristics must a mental event possess in order to be the proximate cause of action? Brand contends that no philosophical theory of the relation between intending and acting has been offered which includes the conative feature of intending as an element. Therefore, he thinks that no philosophical theory of the relation between intending and acting has answered the fundamental question in action theory.
I shall argue, however, that one contemporary theory of the relation between intending and acting does contain an account of the conative feature of which Brand speaks. I shall submit that Hector-Neri Castaneda's theory of the relation between intending and acting provides an answer to the fundamental question in action theory. My thesis is also important to understanding the distinctive nature of Castafieda's action theory. Traditionally, the objects of intending episodes have been taken to be propositions.' A problem with this view is that one can endorse a future-tense proposition (e.g. 'I will jump') without jumping. Endorsing a proposition does not, by itself, produce action. In other words, an agent can think of doing an action and not do it. Castaneda, however, unlike his counterparts who hold that the objects of intending episodes are propositions, does explain the causality that is operative in intentional actions. He does so by theorizing that the objects of intending episodes are practitions, ResponsibiIity,
